Stafford v. Kootenai County Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 37320 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-7-2010
Stafford v. Kootenai County Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 37320
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Stafford v. Kootenai County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 37320" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2602.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2602
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DOUGLAS and MICHELLE STAFFORD, SUPREME COURT NO. 37320-2010 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Kootenai County Case No. CV -09-2516 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Court Judge, Presiding 
Appeal from the District Court ofthe First 
Judicial District For Kootenai County 
John F. Magnuson, ISB #4270 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Telephone: (208) 667-0100 
Attorney for Appellants 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney, ISB #6020 
Kootenai County Legal Services 
P.O. Box 9000 
451 Government Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
Telephone: (208) 446-1620 
Attorney for Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 1 
B. Course of Proceedings .............................................. 1 
C. Statement of Facts ................................................. 1 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ........................................ 1 
III. ARGUMENT ........................................................... 1 
A. The Board's Decision Finding a Violation Under Ordinance No. 374 Was 
Erroneous as a Matter of Law ......................................... 1 
1. The Only Violation With Which the Staffords Could Have Been 
Charged Was Under Ordinance No. 283 .......................... 1 
2. The County's Implicit Finding ofa Violation Under Ordinance No. 
283 is an Error as a Matter of Law ............................... 2 
3. The time for charging a violation under Ordinance No. 283, for 
Conduct Occurring Prior to December 12,2005, Has Passed .......... 3 
4. Ordinance No. 374 Cannot Apply Retroactively .................... 4 
5. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 337 Does Not Suggest a Contrary 
Result ..................................................... 6 
6. The County Failed to Avail Itself of the Appropriate Remedy ......... 6 
B. The Staffords' Substantial Rights Were Prejudiced by the Kootenai County 
Board's Decision .................................................. 7 
C. The Staffords Adopt the Remaining Arguments Contained in Their Opening 
Brief ............................................................ 7 
IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 8 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Byers, 
102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788 (1981) ........................................... 4 
STATUTES PAGE 
Idaho Code § 19-403 ............................................................ 3 
Idaho Code §5-224 ............................................................. 3 
OTHER AUTHORITIES PAGE 
Kootenai County Code § 1-2-3 .................................................... 6 
Kootenai County Ordinance No. 283 ......................................... 1-3,6, 7 
Kootenai County Ordinance No. 337 ............................................. 6-8 
Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374 ...................................... , 1,2,4-6,8 
11 
I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In their Opening Brief, Appellants Douglas and Michelle Stafford (hereafter "the Staffords") 
set forth a statement of the "Nature of the Case" at page 1, which is incorporated herein. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
In their Opening Brief, the Staffords set forth a statement ofthe "Course of Proceedings" at 
pages 1-3, which is incorporated herein. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In their Opening Brief, the Staffords set forth a detailed "Statement of Facts" at pages 3-10, 
which is incorporated herein. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
The issues are as stated by the Staffords in their Opening Brief(at p. 10) and by Respondent 
Kootenai County (hereafter "the County") at p. 6 of its Response Brief. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Board's Decision Finding a Violation Under Ordinance No. 374 Was 
Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
1. The Only Violation With Which the Staffords Could Have Been 
Charged Was Under Ordinance No. 283. 
The following facts are undisputed: 
(1) The Staffords submitted their initial application for a building permit in July 
of 1999. See A.R., Vol. I, p. 0028. 
(2) Construction under the initial building permit was completed in 2000. 
Kootenai County signed off on the Staffords' initial "Certificate of 
Occupancy" on March 23,2000. Id. at pp. 0039-0040. 
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(3) The Staffords completed certain improvements within the twenty-five (25) 
set back zone applicable to their property by the summer of2001. Id. at p. 
0058. 
(4) Kootenai County took photographic evidence of the status of the Stafford 
property, documenting the foregoing improvements, as early as Julyof2002. 
Id. at p. 0013. 
(5) Five years later, on August 29, 2007, the County issued the subject "Notice 
of Violation" to the Staffords, claiming that the Staffords violated Ordinance 
No. 374. Id. at p. 0005. 
Against this background, the Court needs to examine the effective dates of Ordinance Nos. 283 and 
374 (the ordinance under which the Staffords were actually cited). 
Ordinance No. 283 became effective July 26, 1999. R, p. 64. Ordinance No. 283 remained 
in effect until "superseded by" Ordinance No. 374 on December 12,2005. See A.R., Vol. I, p. 0093. 
Thus, between July 26, 1999, and December 12,2005, Ordinance No. 283 was effective. 
There is no dispute that the conduct complained of occurred in the summer of2001. The 
County, admits as much in its response brief See Respondents' Brief at pp. 3, 5. According to the 
County, "A violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time the first disturbance 
occurred in the summer of2001 until Ordinance 374 took effect on December 12,2005 .... " Id. at 
p. 10 (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding the same, at no point in time has the County ever cited 
the Staffords for violating Ordinance No. 283. 
2. The County's Implicit Finding of a Violation Under Ordinance No. 283 
is an Error as a Matter of Law. 
The Board acknowledged in deliberations that Ordinance No. 283 was the effective ordinance 
at the time the improvements were completed. Commissioner Tondee stated: 
The new ordinance going forward would be 374. That does not negate that the time 
period that ordinance was in effect prior or the previous ordinance 283 was in effect 
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prior to that.... [T]he work was done there was an ordinance in effect that did not 
allow the work that was done in 2001. Uh, and the work that was done in 2001 was 
done without a permit.. .. 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0091-0092. Commissioner Piazza agreed: "I do believe that [Ordinance] 283 
was in effect at the time [that the improvements were completed]." Id. at p. 009S. 
3. The time for charging a violation under Ordinance No. 283, for Conduct 
Occurring Prior to December 12,2005, Has Passed. 
A violation of Ordinance No. 283 carries criminal penalties. A violation of the ordinance 
is a criminal misdemeanor and "shall be punishable by a maximum fine of $300 or six (6) months 
in jail, or both." Ordinance No. 283 further provides that "[ e ]ach day of violation shall constitute 
a separate offense." With Ordinance No. 283 being repealed effective December 12, 200S, the last 
day of any "offense," under said ordinance, was December 11, 200S. 
Any prosecution for a criminal misdemeanor under Ordinance No. 283, based upon conduct 
occurring before December 11, 200S, has passed. See LC. §19-403 (setting forth a one (1) year 
period of limitations for prosecution of a criminal misdemeanor). Any civil enforcement action, 
based upon violations occurring through and including December 11, 200S, has also passed. SeeI.C. 
§S-224 (setting forth the general four (4) year period of limitations applicable to civil actions not 
otherwise specified). 
The last day for charging the Staffords with a criminal violation based upon conduct claimed 
to violate Ordinance No. 283 would have been December 11,2006. The last day for brining a civil 
enforcement action against the Staffords for conduct claimed to violate Ordinance No. 283 would 
have been December 11,2009. No such actions were brought or have been brought. 
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4. Ordinance No. 374 Cannot Apply Retroactively. 
Ordinance No. 374, by its own tenns, applies to conduct occurring on or after December 12, 
2005 (the effective date). There is no dispute that by December 12, 2005, the objectionable 
encroachments had been in place for over four years. There is also no dispute that the general 
principle of law is that a criminal prohibition cannot be applied retroactively. See,~, State v. 
Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1981). 
The County claims that only civil relief has been pursued against the Staffords and that 
Ordinance No. 374, as apparently applied to these facts, is not "penal" in nature. This argument 
should be rejected. While no criminal prosecution has yet been initiated against the Staffords, as of 
this date, the ordinance clearly provides that any conduct found to violate the ordinance "shall be 
punishable" as a criminal misdemeanor. Thus, there is no prohibition against the County from 
utilizing the results of this civil enforcement action to create some sort of argument, by way of 
collateral estoppel or otherwise, in a subsequent criminal prosecution. To state that Ordinance No. 
374 is not "penal," as applied to these facts, is to ignore the language of the ordinance and the 
practical realities presented. 
Notwithstanding that a finding for violation under Ordinance No. 374 could be foisted upon 
the Staffords through a subsequent criminal prosecution, the District Court found that an ex post 
Jacto analysis was inappropriate. R., p. 137. It is respectfully submitted that the District Court erred. 
The District Court found that, as a prerequisite to application of the ex post Jacto analysis, 
the act complained of must have been "innocent when done." Id. (citations omitted). "Innocent" 
in this context should be examined in light of generally accepted equitable principles. 
To this end, consider the following testimony of Dr. Stafford, which went unrebutted. Dr. 
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Stafford went to Kootenai County Building and Planning Department for advice before undertaking 
any action: 
[W]e finished our house in 2000 and moved in. In the summer of .. 
. 2001, we decided that we would like to do something that would 
clean that up. It was a - it was a mess. At that time, we did hire a 
landscaper. Uh, talked to him - came up with some plans. I personally 
went down to Planning and Zoning and talked to the lady behind the 
counter. I don't know her name, but it was in 2001. And specifically 
asked her, and told her our situation, it had been tom up uh was there 
a problem with us planting grass and trees. And she told us that re-
greening was never a problem. And okay, so if I plant grass and 
plants and trees down there, its not a problem. She repeated re-
greening is not a problem. So we went ahead .... 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0057-0058. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony that the improvements were 
completed in 2001: 
I have since cleaned up the beach a little bit and moved some rocks 
around and things like that, but urn, so in 2001, our project was 
completed down there and as the photographs and records show we 
were not trying to hide anything - it was there. 
Id. at p. 0058. Photographs offered by the Department show that by July of 2002, the Stafford 
property had been cleaned up, including areas within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0013. This included the addition of sand to the sand that previously existed (as 
confirmed by Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), "re-greening" as verbally approved by the 
Department (as also confirmed by Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), and a portion of a barbeque 
pit that was approved by the County and that is not in dispute. Illustrative photographs are included 
in the Agency Record at Vol. I, pp. 0011-0025. 
Against this background, the ex post facto analysis urged by the Stafford should apply. 
Ordinance No. 374 is penal. A civil finding can be used to buttress a criminal prosecution. The 
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action done by Dr. Stafford prior to the effective date of Ordinance No. 374 was in fact innocent, 
under prevailing equitable principles. It was done with the consent and knowledge of the County. 
To hold to the contrary would be patently unfair and would unnecessarily subject the Staffords to 
the threat of criminal penalties and prosecution for an act innocently done and an act that could have 
been prosecuted under Ordinance No. 283. 
5. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 337 Does Not Suggest a Contrary Result. 
Kootenai County, in its response brief, argues that the Commissioners' finding of a violation 
under Ordinance No. 374 is defensible given Section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code (adopted 
through Ordinance No. 337). Section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code provides: 
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether 
such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed 
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or 
punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the former 
ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or 
so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or 
claim arising before the new ordinance takes effect. ... 
See K.C.C. § 1-2-3 (R., pp. 100-06). 
The problem with the County's argument, based upon K.C.c. § 1-2-3, is twofold. First, the 
Staffords weren't cited for violating Ordinance No. 283. That was the ordinance in effect when the 
violations occurred. Second, the Staffords can't now be cited with violating Ordinance No. 283, as 
both the criminal and civil statutes of limitation have passed. Accordingly, the protections relied 
upon by the County through K.C.C. § 1-2-3 simply do not apply. 
6. The County Failed to Avail Itself of the Appropriate Remedy. 
The County could have cited the Staffords for a violation under Ordinance No. 283 given that 
the ordinance was in effect when the offending encroachments were installed. The County had 
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actual notice of the encroachments as early as 2001. The County chose to do nothing. The County 
let six years pass and then issued a notice of violation, albeit under the wrong code section. Had the 
County brought a civil enforcement action, as it did, under Ordinance No. 283, by December 11, 
2009, this portion of the Stafford's argument might be moot. However, the County did not bring a 
timely action nor did it amend the charging document. 
B. The Staffords' Substantial Rights Were Prejudiced by the Kootenai County 
Board's Decision. 
The County argues that the Staffords have failed to state a claim for relief on appeal, under 
LLUP A, because, according to the County, "no substantial rights of Stafford have been prejudiced." 
See Kootenai County's Response Brief at p. 21. This argument is specious. 
The Staffords own the property. The Staffords went to Kootenai County and asked for 
guidance. They were given advice which the County does not dispute (but which the County no 
longer agrees with). The Staffords placed the improvements on their property, under the watchful 
eye of the County, and with the County's knowledge. The County did nothing. The County did not 
bring any action under Ordinance No. 283, whether civil or criminal. The time for so doing passed. 
The rights of the Staffords under the prior ordinance (Ordinance No. 283) have vested as a 
grandfathered non-conformity. Since those rights predate the effective date of Ordinance No. 337, 
the Staffords do in fact have substantial rights no different in kind or degree than improvements 
completed prior to the adoption of Ordinance No. 283. 
C. The Staffords Adopt the Remaining Arguments Contained in Their Opening 
Brief. 
The Staffords adopt the remaining arguments previously set forth in their Opening Brief. 
These include the arguments regarding the inapplicability of Ordinance No. 337 (given that the 
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Stafford property was "disturbed" and "non-native" before any work was undertaken by the 
Staffords). These also include the Staffords' arguments in support oftheir claim that the County 
should be estopped to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 337 based upon the undisputed and 
unrebutted recommendations of Kootenai County planning staff. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, and in the Staffords' Opening Brief, 
the Staffords respectfully request that this Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners, and find that, as a matter of law, there has been no violation of 
Ordinance No. 374. Staffords further request entry of an order remanding the matter with 
instructions that the Notice of Violation be dismissed and that the recorded notice of the same be 
removed from the real property records of Kootenai County. The Staffords further request an award 
of costs incurred herein pursuantJ IAR 43. 
~y\_ 
DATED this day of September, 2010. 
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